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Abstract
This paper examines how the duration of wage contracts inuences in-
novation incentives, wages and employment. We nd that wages are non-
monotone in the duration of wage contracts. Furthermore, a positive and
one-to-one relation between innovation and union utility exists and both at-
tain their highest value under a long-term contract. Prots may vary depend-
ing on the extent of R&D spillovers and the associated raising rivals cost
incentive, although they are highest when union/rms engage in a long-term
contractual relation. Testable predictions to discriminate between short-term
and long-term contracts are also discussed.
Keywords: Wage contracts; R&D; Spillovers; Raising rivalscost.
JEL Classication: J41; J51; L13; O31.
1 Introduction
There is an ever increasing interest in the investigation of the relation between
unionism and spending on R&D. However, despite the large body of theoretical
and empirical studies on this issue, the ndings so far seem to paint a mixed pic-
ture. On the one hand, slowed down growth rates have often been attributed to
the unions rent-extraction (Grout 1984; Manning 1987; Ulph and Ulph 1994). On
the other hand, unions are perceived as institutions with constructive presence. In
this respect, they smooth industrial relations, encourage greater employee training
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and therefore, accelerate new technology adoption (Tauman and Weiss 1987; Ulph
and Ulph 1998; Haucap and Wey 2004). Apart from such behavioural considera-
tions that may occasionally encourage or deter innovation, equally as important are
other factors in inuencing innovation incentives: the temporal dimension of wage
contracts may be regarded as such.
The large body of union-oligopoly literature has dealt extensively only with
specic aspects of innovative activity and labour market organisation. First, most
of the studies postulate that wage negotiations take place at rm-level. Haucap and
Wey (2004) report that: As this literature has focused exclusively on decentralised
modes of wage setting...the relative performance of more centralised wage systems
remains an open issue.... Second, R&D has usually been modelled as a patent
race, where the rm rst to innovate is rewarded by a perfect patent.1 Third, there
is relatively scant attention on how the temporal dimension (or timing) of wage
setting may a¤ect innovation.
The main purpose of the present paper is to investigate how the duration of
wage contracts a¤ects innovation incentives by addressing these issues within a
single model. Barcena-Ruiz and Campo (2004) examine the relation between the
timing of wage setting and innovation under decentralised wage-setting at the rm-
level. They found that when the size of the market is su¢ ciently large and the R&D
technology is relatively e¢ cient, then unions may choose to set wages simultane-
ously; in this case, the R&D investment becomes largest. Haucap and Wey (2004)
analyse the e¤ect of unionisation structures on innovation incentives and uncover
a non-monotone relation between the level of wage setting and innovation incen-
tives. Another study closely related to the present one is Banerjee and Lin (2003).
They consider a two-tier market structure where the downstream rms engage in
cost-reducing R&D. The focus of the analysis is the relation between input price
contracts and innovation incentives. In line with our analysis, they obtain that long-
term input price contracts promote innovation and enhance welfare. Although the
case of (upstream) input suppliers encompasses labour unions as a special case, the
study by Banerjee and Lin did not allow for R&D spillovers. Finally, Manasakis and
Zikos (2007) explored the unions/rms incentives to form Research Joint Ventures
(RJV), while allowing the possibility for rent-sharing. They found that rms have
incentives to form an RJV when spillovers are su¢ ciently large and that unions will
approve the RJV formation; however, if spillovers are relatively small, rms have
to part with some rents to make the RJV attractive to unions and this will weaken
their incentives.
1See, for instance, Ulph and Ulph (1994, 2001) and Haucap and Wey (2004).
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As a framework for analysing the relation between wage contracts and innova-
tion, we consider a model with a central union2 and n rms in vertical disposition.
The basic set-up is, in principle, a straightforward extension of Banerjee and Lin
(2003) by relaxing their (implicit) assumption of perfect patent protection with the
addition of R&D spillovers. Furthermore, apart from exploring the desirable con-
tract from each partys (union/rms) perspective, we address the issue of which
contract is more likely to be adopted in equilibrium. In making such predictions
we utilise the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), where in
stage one both parties simultaneously announce at which period they will move
(and commit to this decision); at the following stage(s) both parties choose their
decision variables according to their previous announcements and nally, all rms
choose their output levels.
More precisely, the present paper assumes that there is a central union repre-
senting the industry workers. The union sets the wage whereas rms retain the
right to choose employment (see Booth 1995; Haucap and Wey 2004). Firms com-
pete both in the output and in the R&D market where they invest in cost reducing
R&D with a two-fold perspective: (i) to reduce own costs in the rst place and
(ii) to raise their rivalscosts (RRC), if possible. The second innovation incentive
may only arise under ex post (or short-term) contracting.3 This case is modelled
as a three-stage game. That is, the rms rst choose their R&D levels. The union
then chooses its wage level at the second stage4 and rms compete in output at the
third stage. In this situation, the wage contract is conditioned on the amount of
R&D. Indeed, the implied exibility over the terms of contract reduces the benets
from R&D, thus leading to a lower investment. On the other hand, a long-term
contractual relation reects a wage that is specied before the rms investment
decisions. More precisely, we consider that in the rst stage the union sets the
wage and in the second stage rms choose their R&D levels. Finally, as under
a short-term contract, rms choose their output levels. A comparison of the two
games reveals that although under long-term contracting the RRC e¤ect vanishes,
this type of contract promotes innovation, as it implies a disciplinary e¤ect on the
2Centralised wage-setting at an industry level is common practise eg., in the Nordic countries,
in Germany and Ireland. In other instances, it is possible that wage negotiations take place at
rm-level, although with certain elements of centralised negotiations, eg., UK and Spain (see,
Mauleon and Vannetelbosch 2003).
3The reasons that justify a short-term relation are for instance, the absence of reputation e¤ects
or repeated interaction, as well as the inability to commit not to renegotiate an ex ante contract
(see Ulph and Ulph 2001, for a more detailed discussion).
4Unions will generally behave with a shorter-term horizon compared with the rmssharehold-
ers (Baldwin 1983). This observation suggests an opportunistic behaviour when short-term wage
contracts are signed, which comes into e¤ect after investment is sunk.
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union wage demands. Moreover, a long-term contract may make all parties rms
and the trade union better o¤ by generating a greater cost reduction that will
unambiguously expand available employment opportunities and improve welfare.
We also show that a long-term contract will indeed be chosen in equilibrium when
the union/rms respective decisions are endogenised.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The formal analytical framework
is presented in section 2. Sections 3 and 4 deal, respectively, with the cases of
short-term and long-term wage contracts, while section 4 compares them with a
medium-term contract. Section 5 extends the basic model by endogenising the
decision on the contract type. Finally, section 6 concludes and presents our testable
predictions with a view to distinguishing in practice among the various types of
contractual relations.
2 The model
We consider a unionised industry that consists of a single labour union and n
rms indexed by i = 1; :::; n, producing a homogeneous good. We postulate a
two-tier industry where the union is at the upstream tier and the n rms at the
downstream. The inverse demand function is of the standard form p = a Pni=1 qi,
for
Pn
i=1 qi  a. The production process involves only labour as an input and one
unit of a nal good requires exactly one unit of labour. That is, all rms are endowed
with linear one-factor technologies, qi = iLi, where i is rm is productivity of
labour.5 Without loss of generality, we assume that labour productivity is identical
across rms and normalised to unity, i.e., i = 1.
The marginal cost of production is initially constant at c + w > 0, where w
denotes the industry-wide wage and c is the uniform marginal cost of transforming
one unit of labour input into one unit of the nal product. However, rms have
the opportunity to lower their marginal cost from c + w to c + w   xi, 0 < xi <
c + w, via investing in process R&D. The cost of such activity is assumed to be
quadratic, x2i , reecting that process innovation takes place at decreasing returns.
6
In addition, there are inter-rm spillover e¤ects that induce a further reduction in
5This one-to-one form of technology is equivalent to a two-factor Leontief technology with the
capital being xed (in the short-run) and large enough to avoid driving the marginal product of
labour to zero (see eg., Petrakis and Vlassis 2005; Manasakis and Zikos 2007).
6The adoption of a quadratic cost function alleviates to some extent the hold-upproblem that
may arise in a unionized industry when rms have the opportunity to undertake an investment
project (i.e., sink a specic amount of money) in order to implement a new technology that lowers
their production cost. In our model, it remains in the rmsdiscretion to decide how much to
invest and therefore determine how severe the hold-upwill be.
4
a rms marginal cost. Thus, the marginal cost borne by rm i is
ci(xi; x i) = w + c  xi   x i, x i =
P
j 6=i
xj, (1)
where  captures the extent of spillover e¤ects. The following assumption is made:
Assumption 1. Let A = a   c be a measure of the market size. Given that
0    1, we have that (i) 0  w < A and (ii) xi + x i  w + c:
Part (i) implies that rms have always an incentive to hire workers, while part
(ii) ensures an economically meaningful investment level. This assumption is main-
tained throughout the rest of the paper.
The labour market is unionized and all workers are assumed to be identically
skilled. Moreover, a central union represents all industry workers with the objective
of rent maximization for its risk-neutral members, given xed union membership
(see Booth 1995 and Oswald 1982).7 Hence, the utility function of the central union
can be written as
U =
nP
i=1
(w   w0)Li, 0 < w0 < A; (2)
where w0 is the workersreservation wage8 and Li is the employment level of rm
i.
We analyse and compare two three-stage games.
(i) The long-term wage contract ( l). In this case, the union sets the wage in
stage one. Firms then choose their R&D levels at the second stage and compete in
output at the third stage.
(ii) The short-term wage contract ( s). The rms choose their R&D levels; then
the union sets the wage and nally rms choose their output levels.
Under both scenarios, the union has all the power to decide the wage rate
subject to the rmslabour demand curves, while each rm then simply determines
from its labour demand curve the level of employment at the specied wage (so-
7Fixed union membership amounts to saying that the central union operates as a closed shop,
that is a worker displaced from a rm may be able to nd a job in another rm. Furthermore, any
worker employed in our model-industry will receive the wage rate being the outcome of the union-
rms interaction. This latter observation gives rise to the raising rivalscost potential between
the downstream competitors via spending on R&D as we shall see.
8In the union-oligopoly literature, a workers outside option, given that all workers are identi-
cally skilled, is usually conceptualized as a weighted average of the competitve wage and unem-
ployment benets, where the respective weights are the probabilities of nding or not a job in the
competitive sector. It is worth noting that within our modeleconomy, we do not treat explicitly
the competitive (or numeraire) sector, as it is not crucial for our results.
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called monopoly-union model). Our objective is to obtain a Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium (SPNE) of those games by backward induction.
The prot function of rm i is
i = (a  qi   q i)qi   (c+ w   xi   x i)qi, q i =
P
j 6=i
qj: (3)
Maximizing prots with respect to qi gives rise to the rst order condition (foc)
A  2qi   q i   w + xi + x i = 0. (4)
Introducing symmetry qi = qj and solving the system of the n focs as in (4), we
obtain rm is equilibrium output
qi(xi; x i; w) =
n(A  w) + (2 + n  2)xi + [n   2(1 )n 1 ]x i
n(n+ 1)
: (5)
Equilibrium prots and employment, given R&D investment and wage determined
at the preceding stages of the game, are
i(xi; x i; w) = [qi(xi; x i; w)]2, Li(xi; x i; w) = qi(xi; x i; w). (6)
The solution to the rmsR&Dmaximization problem along with the unions choice
of a wage are closely characterised in the next two sections.
3 Short-term wage contracts
In the second stage of the game, the central union chooses w to maximize its ob-
jective (2): Solving this maximization problem, we obtain the industry-wide equi-
librium wage9
w(xi; x i) =
n(A+ w0) + [1 + (n  1)](xi + x i)
2
. (7)
The wage increases with the workers reservation income, w0. More interestingly,
it increases with the rmsR&D e¤orts, xi and x i. That is, a greater R&D e¤ort
promotes the demand for labour and leads to a higher wage at higher level of
employment. The following lemma summarizes.
Lemma 1 In an oligopoly (n  2) with linear demand and informational spillovers,
9The second order condition (soc) reads as  2n=(1 + n) < 0.
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under a short-term wage contract, the wage and each rms R&D investment is a
strategic complement from the central unions perspective.
Substituting w into (5) and (6) yields equilibrium output, prots and employ-
ment. Then at the R&D stage of the game, the prot function of rm i is given by
i(xi; x i) = (qi)2   x2i . Maximizing the relevant expression with respect to xi and
imposing symmetry xi = xj; yields the i-th rms equilibrium investment10
xsi =
(A  w0)[1 + n(1 + n(1  ))  ]


; (8)
where 
 =  (1  )2+n(3+ 2)+n2(7+ (1  ))+n3 (4  (1  )) > 0. Using
(8) and the expressions for output and wage, (5) and (7), we obtain
qsi =
2n(1 + n)(A  w0)


; (9)
ws =
2n(1 + n)2A+ w0


; (10)
where  =  (1  )2 + n(1 + 2) + n2(3 + (1  )) + n3(2  (1  )) > 0: Then
from (9), (10) and (2) we can nd union utility
U s =
nP
i=1
(ws   w0)qsi =
4n3(1 + n)3(A  w0)2

2
: (11)
Finally, each rm will make prot
si =
(A  w0)2

2
; (12)
where =  2n(1 ) (1 )2+n2(1+2(2 ))+2n3(3+)+n4(3+(2 )) > 0:
4 Long-term wage contracts
We now turn to investigate the case where the central union ex ante commits to
a certain wage. The output selection stage of the game is the same as for the
previous market arrangement. In the second stage, however, each rm maximizes
10The soc is  [4n4+3(1 )2+na1+2n3a2 n2a3]=2n2(1+n)2 < 0, where a1 = 2  6+42;
a2 = 2+3 2; a3 = 2 10+52: It is readily veried that this requirement is always fullled.
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prots with respect to xi given x i: That is,
max
xi
(
n(A  w) + (2 + n  2)xi + [n   2(1 )n 1 ]x i
n(n+ 1)
)2
  x2i :
The solution to the focs yields equilibrium investment as a function of the industry
wage11
xi(w) =
(A  w)[(2 + n2)(1  ) + n(1 + )]
L
; (13)
where L =  2(1 )2+n(1 (2 3))+n2(1+)(3 2)+n3(2 (1 )) > 0.
Notice that the R&D reaction function of each downstream rm has a negative
slope: when the union opts for a higher wage, this reduces the rents available for
spending on R&D, thereby leading to a lower investment.
Lemma 2 Given that n  2, under a long-term wage contract, the wage and each
rms R&D investment is a strategic substitute from each rms perspective.
This result, in conjunction with the one in the previous lemma, portrays the
union/rms conicting objectives. Moreover, it suggests that an alternative order
of moves (i.e., the duration of wage contracts) may give rise to di¤erent results,
highlighting the importance of union/rm roles in the potential contractual agree-
ments.
In the rst stage, the union chooses the wage that maximizes its rents, antici-
pating how its decision will a¤ect the rmschoice at the R&D selection stage. The
solution to this problem is12
wl =
A+ w0
2
: (14)
Then the SPNE solutions of the entire game follow
xli =
(A  w0)[(2 + n2)(1  ) + n(1 + )]
2L
(15)
qli =
n(1 + n)(A  w0)
L
(16)
U l =
nP
i=1
(wl   w0)qli =
n2(1 + n)(A  w0)2
2L
(17)
li =
(A  w0)2
4L2
; (18)
11With soc  [2=n((1 + n)2][n3 + n2(1 + )  n(1  3 + 22)  2(1  )] < 0:
12The soc requires  4n2(1 + n)=L < 0:
8
where  =  4(1 )2 4n(1 2) n2(1 (6 5))+2n3(3+2)+n4(3+(2 )) >
0:
In order to facilitate comparison between the two contractual regimes presented
so far, we proceed by computing the SPNE outcome of a game termed as medium-
term wage contract (m). That game has two stages. In stage one the union and
rms act simultaneously so as to maximize their objectives and in the second stage
rms compete in quantities à la Cournot. The solution of this game is relegated to
the Appendix A1.
5 Comparing the wage contracts
We proceed to classify the wage and employment levels depending on the mode
of the union/rms moves (i.e., type of wage contract). The following Proposition
presents the result:
Proposition 1 For all n  2, a long-term wage contract induces the lowest wage
but the highest employment. That is, the following ordering obtains:
(i) wl < ws < wm,
(ii) Lsi < L
m
i < L
l
i.
Proposition 1 shows the di¤erent e¤ects that the timing of wage-setting implies
on wages and employment. Under a medium-term contract workers are entitled to
the highest wage, while the lowest wage is due to a long-term contract. This ordering
suggests that the relation between wages and the duration of wage contracts is
non-monotone. That is, wages are intermediate for a short-term arrangement and
highest for a medium-term one. Comparing the wage rates for a short-term and a
long-term contract, we nd that the former is always dominant. The rationale is
simple: under a long-term arrangement the wage is not conditioned on the amount of
R&D investment.13 This means that a short-term contract reects an opportunistic
behaviour by the trade union in response to downstream innovation. By raising
the wage level after rms have invested in R&D, the central union is therefore able
to extract some rents of the innovative activity. Regarding employment levels, our
nding is also intuitively appealing, indicating that rms are willing to hire the
most workers under the l structure.
These predictions may also suggest the type of contract that is most conducive
to innovation. As rms recognize ex ante the opportunistic behaviour of the trade
13In other words, under a long-term wage contract, the central union commits credibly to a
wage level (which remains unaltered after rms have invested in R&D).
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union under a short-term arrangement, they would be willing to undertake larger
investments under a credible commitment on the wage level, namely a long-term
contract. We can therefore state the following result:
Proposition 2 A long-term contract generates the largest innovation; i.e., xli >
xmi > x
s
i .
Proposition 2 shows that a long-term arrangement generates the largest incen-
tives for R&D. The reason is that under this contractual regime, the problem arising
due to the opportunistic behaviour of the trade union (i.e., setting a higher wage
due to the rmsinnovation) vanishes. In turn, this may suggest that a long-term
settlement promotes innovation compared with any other type of (shorter-term)
agreement, where the wage rate may not be ex ante guaranteed.
We are now in position to characterize the unions preferences over the set of
wage contracts, were the union able to choose one. The next Proposition o¤ers the
result:
Proposition 3 Under a long-term contract the central unions wage bill is maxi-
mized; i.e., U l > Um > U s.
From Proposition 1, the relevant forces to determine the size of the wage bill
(above the reservation wage) are the wage and the employment levels. It turns out
that the latter has a larger impact on union utility: although wages are the lowest
under a long-term contract, employment is the highest among all possible regimes.
This observation suggests that credible commitment over the terms of wage-setting
is therefore the unions most preferred choice.
Combining Propositions 2 and 3, we can readily identify a positive and one-to-
one relation between investment and union utility. That is, a long-term contract
carries the largest innovation incentives and union utility levels. The reason for
this is simple: the union recognising that rms will be willing to undertake larger
investment projects under a long-term contract, decides to commit to a certain wage.
This also means that the union anticipates to be compensatedfor its commitment
via higher employment. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the union will be
granted these benets on the basis of a simple mechanism: a larger amount invested
in R&D will reduce the marginal cost, increase the demand for the nal good, thus
resulting in greater employment (and union utility).
All contract types imply a relative cost advantage14 for a rm (over its rivals) via
spending on R&D. Restricting attention for a moment to a short-term and a long-
14It is worth noting that an absolute cost advantage for a downstream rm under a short-term
contract would only arise if innovation was fully protected against imitation, i.e.,  = 0.
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term contract, we know that in the former case, it remains in the unions discretion
to adjust the wage in response to R&D. Hence, as pointed out in the introduction,
an R&D investment by rm i will a¤ect its own prot in two ways: (a) by raising its
rivalscosts (through the unions response to R&D) and (b) by lowering own costs.
On the grounds of Proposition 1 (i) and 2, the e¤ect described in (a) is largest
under regime m (but lowest under regime l), while regime l generates the largest
e¤ect in (b). It turns out, however, that the e¤ect (on rmsprots) described in
(b) will always dominate the e¤ect in (a). This explains the content of part (i) in
the following Proposition, which presents an ordering of rmsprots:
Proposition 4 (i) A long-term contract leads to the highest prots, li > 
s
i , 
l
i >
mi ; and will be always preferred by rms.
(ii) There exists a threshold value ~(n) such that si > 
m
i if  < ~(n) and
si < 
m
i if  > ~(n): The critical value is decreasing in the number of rms in the
industry.
Interestingly, the ranking in part (ii) depends on the extent of spillovers. As
mentioned previously in (a), each downstream rm has an incentive to raise its
rivalscosts. For a short-term contract this opportunity is present, while it vanishes
both for a long-term and a medium-term contract. According to Proposition 4 (ii),
a rm will choose a short-term contract if spillovers are relatively weak. The reason
is that in this case a rm can raise its rivals costs without hurting itself as much
due to increases in its own wage induced by R&D spillovers. (Refer also to the
previous footnote.) On the other hand, when spillovers are relatively intense, an
innovating rm will switch to a medium-term contract. A medium-term contract
will generate a larger investment in R&D; in fact, wages will be higher, too. Hence,
we can overall state that the RRC incentive (associated with a short-term contract)
is relatively strong as long as spillovers are su¢ ciently weak: although innovation is
lower under a short-term contract, also labour costs are lower and coexistent with
the RRC potential. The content of Proposition 4 (ii) is presented in Figure 1.15
15We have divided the relevant expressions by (A  w0)2.
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Figure 1: Contour plot of the di¤erence in prots between short-term and medium-term wage contracts. Note
that in the white area medium-term prots are higher; in the dark area they are lower.
From Propositions 3 and 4, the result presented below is immediate:
Proposition 5 The most preferred wage settlement both for the central union and
rms is a long-term contract.
Proposition 5 suggests that the union and rms will always prefer to engage in a
long-term contractual relation independently of the extent of spillovers. Under a
long-term contract the union will act as a Stackelberg leader while rms will be the
followers. Recall from Proposition 2 that this type of contract promotes innovation
compared with any other arrangement. A higher investment in R&D will lower
rmsmarginal cost and in turn, reduce the market price and expand output, thus
leading to higher consumer surplus. In addition, according to Propositions 3 and
4, union utility and rmsprots are higher when wages are settled for a long-
term period. Therefore, a long-term contract will not only be preferred by rms
and the labour union but will also lead to higher welfare than a short-term or a
medium-term arrangement.16
6 Extension to endogenous wage contracts
In this section, we endogenise the rmsdecision on the type of wage contract to
examine whether our main result in Proposition 5 remains robust to this alternative
specication. Thus we adopt the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990) in the context of a unionised industry. In the rst stage rms and the labour
union announce simultaneously and independently in which period (or stage) they
16The relevant expressions are presented in the Appendix A2. It is worth noting that the
medium-term regime generates lower welfare compared with both the long-term and the short-
term regimes.
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will choose their actions and commit to this decision.17 Each party then takes its
own action, while knowing when the other party will move. This means that a
simultaneous move game will arise if the union and rms act in the same time
period; otherwise, the game will be sequential. A simultaneous move game (for
which both parties act in period 2 or 3) corresponds to a medium-term contract.
By contrast, if all rms act in period 2 and the union acts in period 3, then a short-
term contract will arise; and the contract will be a long-term one if the order of
these moves is reversed.18 Finally, rms choose their output levels. For simplicity,
we restrict attention to the duopoly case. Our objective is to solve for the SPNE of
this extended form game.19
Claim 1 A medium-term contract cannot be sustained as a SPNE outcome.
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that a medium-term contract can be sustained
in equilibrium. Note that the union can increase its utility by deciding to move in
an earlier time period (i.e., switch to a long-term contract).20 This contradiction
establishes the claim.
In line with our previous ndings, the claim above shows that the labour union
is better o¤ being a wage-setting leader than acting simultaneously with the down-
stream rms. The main reason is that a long-term contract carries the largest
innovation incentives and, in turn, promotes the demand for labour and union util-
ity compared with a medium-term contract.
Claim 2 A short-term contract cannot be sustained as a SPNE outcome.
Proof. According to Proposition 3, the labour union has an incentive to deviate
and choose its wage in an earlier time period (i.e., simultaneously with the rms),
rather than being the follower. This proves our claim.
We proceed to present our key result:
Claim 3 The unique SPNE outcome of the contract game is a long-term contract.
17As noted by Pal (1998) who used the observable delay game in a di¤erent context, the as-
sumption of commitmentis not restrictive in the sense that both parties will have no incentive
to deviate from their decision in a later time period.
18The assumption that rms are symmetric practically eliminates the possibility that rms an-
nounce di¤erent time periods to choose their R&D levels, in which case a mixture of a simultaneous
and a sequantial move game would arise.
19The detailed derivations are available from the author on request.
20A similar argument applies to the rms.
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Proof. Under a long-term contract the SPNE outcomes for union utility and
per-rm prots are:
U l = 3(A w0)
2
2(7 +2) ; 
l
i =
(A w0)2(5+4 2)
4(7 +2)2 , i = 1; 2.
Suppose now that, say rm 2, decides to move in an earlier time period and
act simultaneously with the labour union in setting the amount of its R&D. The
corresponding SPNE solutions are:
U = (A w0)
2ER
T 2
; 1 =
(A w0)2(5+4 2)Z2
T 2
; 2 =
(A w0)2(4+11 72+3)2Y
T 2
, where
E = 40+237 942+193 124+25; R = 32+188 852+173 104+25;
T = 76 + 452   2062 + 653   484 + 255   86 + 7; Z = 4 + 39   302 +
173   74 + 5 and Y = 9 + 56   142 + 83   74 + 45   6.
It can be checked that 2   li < 0 for all : That is, rm 2 cannot increase its
prot by switching its decision in an earlier period. Note that the result for rm
1 choosing to deviate (instead of rm 2) follows by analogy. Hence, there is no
unilateral incentive for rm i (i = 1; 2) to invest in R&D at the earlier wage-setting
stage of the game. Moreover, according to the proof of claim 1 (and Proposition 3),
the labour union has no incentive to deviate, as it cannot increase utility by acting
simultaneously with the rms. This completes the proof of our claim.
As we mentioned previously, under a long-term contract the labour union com-
mits ex ante to a certain wage which remains unaltered after rms have conducted
their R&D investments. In this respect, a long-term contract eliminates the oppor-
tunistic behaviour of the labour union and therefore increases R&D and the rms
prot relative to all other regimes. Overall, we showed that our main result carries
over in a setting where the decision over the type of wage contract is endogenous.
Although this was shown to be true for the case of duopolistic competition, we
conjecture that it may also hold for an n-rm oligopoly for reasons similar to those
outlined within our main framework.
7 Conclusions
We constructed a simple non-tournament R&D model with spillovers in order to
treat some of the gaps in the union-oligopoly literature within a unied framework.
The main focus of our analysis was to uncover how the temporal dimension of
wage contracts inuences innovation incentives, wages and employment. Our major
ndings are the following:
(i) Wages are non-monotone with respect to the duration of wage contracts:
they are lowest under a long-term contract and highest under a medium-term one.
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(ii) The wage bill is maximized under a long-term contract and exhibits a positive
and one-to-to one relation with investment levels; both are the lowest under a short-
term arrangement.
(iii) The rmsprots are highest in the case of a long-term contract.
In light of (ii) and (iii), the central union and rms prefer to engage in a long-
term contractual relation. This outcome remains also valid within the context of
the observable delay game. As a long-term contract carries the largest innovation
incentives, it also improves consumer surplus and, in turn, increases the level of
welfare.
Due to practical di¢ culties in distinguishing among the di¤erent types of wage
contracts, we proceed to present some testable predictions, which may facilitate
further research in this direction:
(i) Wages are lower and less volatile with long-term contracts as compared with
short-term contracts. Because long-term contracts smooth wages, innovation is
expected to exhibit a similar behaviour.
(ii) Employment is higher and less volatile under long-term contracts than under
short-term contracts.
All in all, although the relation between unionism and spending on R&D may
still remain context-dependent (Keefe 1992; Menezes-Filho, Ulph and Van Reenen
1998), our purpose was nevertheless to highlight a new aspect of this relation,
namely how the duration of wage contracts a¤ects union wage demands and the
associated incentives for R&D investments.
Appendix
A1. Medium-term wage contracts
The equilibrium output in last stage of the game is given by (5). Then in the
rst stage, the union and the rms, respectively, decide simultaneously on the wage
and the R&D level. The equilibrium wage-R&D pair for the medium-term contract
game is21
xmi =
(A  w0)[(2 + n2)(1  ) + n(1 + )]
N
; (19)
wm =
2nA(1 + n)2 + w0G
N
; (20)
where N =  2(1 )2+n(3 (2 3))+n2(7+(1 2))+n3(4 (1 )) > 0
and G =  2(1  )2+n(1  (2  3))+n2(3+ (1  2))+n3(2  (1  )) > 0:
21The socs are all satised.
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The remainder SPNE solutions obtain
qmi =
2n(1 + n)(A  w0)
N
(21)
Um =
4n3(1 + n)3(A  w0)2
N2
(22)
mi =
(A  w0)2K
N2
; (23)
whereK =  4(1 )2 4n(1 2) n2(1 (6 5))+2n3(3+2)+n4 (3 + (2  )) >
0:
A2. Welfare
Dene social welfare as the sum of consumers surplus, rms prots and union
utility. That is,
SW =
1
2
(
nP
i=1
qi)
2 +
nP
i=1
i +
nP
i=1
(w   w0)qi
Using the SPNE solutions in sections 3 and 4, we can obtain the following
expressions for the cases of the short-term, long-term and medium-term contracts
SW s =
n(A  w0)2J

2
(24)
SW l =
n(A  w0)2M
4L2
; (25)
SWm =
(A  w0)2n	
N2
(26)
where J =  (1   )2   2n(1   ) + n2(5 + 2(2   )) + 2n3(10 + ) + n4(19 +
(2  )) + 6n5 > 0; M =  4(1  )2  8n(1  ) +n2( 3+ (10  3)) +n3(16 
2(1  2))+n4(17+(2  3))+2n5(3 (1 )) > 0; 	 =  4(1 )2  4n(1 
2) + n2(3 + (6   5)) + 2n3(10 + 2) + n4(19 + (2   )) + 6n5 > 0 and 
, L
are dened as previously. Comparing the relevant SPNE solutions, we have that:
SW l   SW s > 0 and SWm   SW s < 0:
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